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Abstract 
Throughout human history, informal sanctions by peers were ubiquitous and played a key role 
in the enforcement of social norms and the provision of public goods. However, a considerable 
body of evidence suggests that informal peer sanctions cause large collateral damage and 
efficiency costs. This raises the question whether peer sanctioning systems exist that avoid these 
costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be 
preferred by the people. Here, we show that efficient peer sanctioning without much need for 
costly punishment emerges quickly if we introduce two relevant features of social life into the 
experiment: (i) subjects can migrate across groups with different sanctioning institutions and 
(ii) they have the chance to achieve consensus about normatively appropriate behavior. We also
show that subjects universally reject peer sanctioning without a norm consensus opportunity –
an institution that has hitherto dominated research in this field – in favor of our efficient peer
sanctioning institution or an equally efficient institution where they delegate the power to
sanction to an elected judge. Migration opportunities and normative consensus building are key
to the quick emergence of an efficient culture of universal cooperation because the more
prosocial subjects populate the two efficient institutions first, elect prosocial judges (if
institutionally possible), and immediately establish a social norm of high cooperation. This norm 
appears to guide subjects’ cooperation and punishment choices, including the virtually complete
removal of antisocial punishment when judges make the sanctioning decision.
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All known human societies – from simple hunter-gatherers societies to modern nation states – enforce 
rules and norms through sanctions (Boehm, 2001; Boehm et al., 1993; Knauft et al., 1991; Sober & 
Wilson, 1998; Wiessner, 2005). Throughout human evolution, peer sanctions, in particular, have played 
a role in the provision of important public goods that ranged from the establishment of social insurance 
through food sharing among hunter-gatherers (Kaplan & Gurven, 2005) and cooperation during warfare 
between neighboring groups in pre-state societies (Mathew & Boyd, 2011) to the organization of 
collective action in industrial conflicts in capitalist societies (Francis, 1985; Roethlisberger & Dickson, 
1939), from the provision of effort under team production in capitalist firms (Nalbantian & Schotter, 
1997; Rehder, 1990)1 to the voluntary recruitment of millions of soldiers for national defense in World 
War I (Simkins, 1988)2.  
However, circumstantial evidence and a sizeable experimental literature on the effects of 
decentralized sanctions in public goods indicates that peer sanctioning causes high collateral damage for 
extended periods of time. These costs frequently even exceed or are as large as the gains from 
cooperation. For example, in the 10-round experiment of (Gächter, Renner, & Sefton, 2008) the cost of 
punishment was considerably higher than the gains from cooperation; subjects would have thus been 
better off in each of the 10 periods in an environment that ruled out the sanctioning of free-riders.3 Peer 
sanctions are also associated with antisocial punishment, i.e., the sanctioning of above-average 
contributors to the public good (Hermann, Thöni, & Gächter, 2008) which further questions their 
suitability.  
In view of the high cost of peer-sanctioning, the question arises whether (i) there are peer-
sanctioning systems that avoid these costs and/or (ii) whether more centralized punishment institutions 
are superior to peer sanctioning. In particular, if an institution based on peer sanctions is very costly and 
inefficient, it seems likely that people would try to leave these groups if possible. They might join groups 
with potentially more efficient sanctioning institutions that, e. g., allocate the authority to punish to an 
                                                     
1 The repertoire of peer sanctions is very broad. It ranges from a “raised eyebrow” in case of inappropriate behavior 
to ridicule, from physical punishment and harassment to ostracism and social exclusion. For example, those who 
failed to share food with other hunter-gatherers without a good reason were ostracized and, in extreme cases, excluded 
from the sharing network (Kaplan & Gurven, 2005). Deserters and cowards in raids against neighboring groups were 
chastised, tied to a tree and beaten by age-mates (Mathew & Boyd, 2011). Rate busters in capitalist firms who 
undermined the going piece rates by working too hard faced harassments from their co-workers (Roethlisberger & 
Dickson, 1939) and strike breakers in industrial conflicts were often subjected to extreme social pressure and 
isolation. (Francis, 1985) describes this with regard to the strikes of the British Miners in 1984-85: “To isolate those 
who supported the ‘scab union’, cinemas and shops were boycotted, there were expulsions from football teams, bands 
and choirs and ‘scabs’ witnessed their own ‘death’ in communities which no longer accepted them”. The peer 
sanctioning of free-riding workers under team production in Japanese-owned auto factories in the US is described in 
(Rehder, 1990) who reports that “the entire team suffers when one person is absent, and the returning team members 
can receive both formal sanctions and informal group pressures upon his or her return. The system is designed to 
function that way and it works very well”. 
2 At the beginning of World War I the British Army relied entirely on the voluntary recruitment of soldiers. Between 
August 1914 (when Britain declared war on Germany) and September 1914 roughly 479 000 volunteers were 
recruited and until December 1915 roughly 2.5 million men joined the British Army voluntarily. Those who did not 
join faced the contempt of their community members who attached big red patches to the free-riders’ front doors at 
night, so that everybody could see that the person living there was a dodger. However, even in those countries – such 
as Germany – that had conscript armies and thus forced a subset of young men into military service, large numbers 
of young men voluntarily joined the army.  
3 In Fehr and Gächter (2000), the total of cost punishment was on average as large as the benefits from increased 
cooperation. Thus, the peer punishment opportunity did not generate any overall welfare gains. In Dreber et al. (2008) 
and in O’Gorman, Henrich, and van Vugt (2009), the peer punishment institution even led to a substantial overall 
welfare loss.  
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elected central authority that refrains from antisocial punishment. In fact, ethnographic evidence indicates 
that early human groups were already characterized by high mobility and frequent migration in and out 
of existing groups (Boehm et al., 1996; Fehr & Henrich, 2003; Hill et al., 2011; Kaplan & Gurven, 2005; 
Mathew & Boyd, 2011; Wiessner, 2005). Migration across groups thus captures an important component 
of social life in the early evolution of humans and throughout human history.  
The results in this paper show that peer sanctioning can be a very effective way of quickly 
establishing a culture of cooperation that enhances its members' welfare. In this culture, free-riding is 
extremely low from the very beginning without much need for punishment. In those rare cases in which 
free-riding occurs, subjects face a punishment probability of nearly 100%, which explains the quick and 
nearly universal compliance with a high cooperation norm. In contrast to previous evidence, subjects in 
our peer sanctioning institution are quickly better off than they would have been in an institution without 
the sanctioning of free-riders. We also show that an institution with an elected central punishment 
authority performs equally well in terms of extremely high cooperation rates from the start and an even 
more rapid welfare improvement relative to an institution without the sanctioning of free-riders. 
However, even when subjects can freely move to the centralized punishment institution, peer sanctioning 
remains popular and attracts a substantial and stable share of the experimental population.  
How is it possible for peer sanctioning and centralized sanctioning by an elected authority to become 
so efficient so quickly? We introduced two elements into our experiment that capture key features of pre-
state societies. First, the opportunity to form a social consensus about normatively appropriate behaviors 
and second, the introduction of the possibility to migrate across groups. The reason for the first element 
is that throughout human evolution – from hunter-gatherer societies to modern nation states – cooperation 
and punishment in the context of public goods is associated with strong normative content and often 
relies on a widely shared normative consensus (Ostrom, 2000). For example, corporal punishment among 
the Turkuna – a politically decentralized, nomadic pastoral society in East Africa – for those who deserted 
and behaved cowardly during warfare requires a community consensus based on an assessment of the 
“badness” of the coward’s behavior (Mathew & Boyd, 2011).  
We introduced the opportunity to achieve a normative consensus within a group by asking each 
subject the following question privately: “How many points do you think each participant should 
contribute to the project?”4 Subjects only needed to insert a single number to answer this question; every 
group member was then informed about the average number announced in the group. The subjects thus 
announced a normative request by answering the question above, and the average normative request 
could potentially become a social norm that coordinates and guides group members’ contribution and 
punishment decisions. Recent research has shown (Fehr & Schurtenberger, 2017), however, that the 
normative request we implemented is completely futile for sustaining cooperation per se, i.e., in the 
absence of a punishment opportunity. This ineffectiveness of the normative request in the absence of 
punishment is a desirable feature because we are not interested in general cooperation-enhancing 
mechanisms in this study. Rather, in view of the widespread role of peer punishment in social life, we 
want to know whether peer punishment (and other punishment institutions) may work well when we 
allow for a normative consensus opportunity.5  
                                                     
4 In the experimental instructions, we used the word “project” to describe the public good.  
5 This is also one reason why we did not allow for face-to-face communication among the subjects. In addition, face-
to-face communication among subjects introduces potential confounds such as sympathy or antipathy among the 
subjects, idiosyncratic communication styles or reputational concerns that go beyond the experiment because subjects 
are no longer anonymous to each other.  
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We introduced migration opportunities in our main experimental treatment by giving subjects the 
choice between different institutions at the beginning of each of 20 periods. This is similar to Gürerk, 
Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach (2006) but in contrast to their experiment our set of available institutions 
includes those with an opportunity to form a normative consensus and an institution with a centralized 
punishment authority. Within an institution, subjects can contribute to, and benefit from, a public good 
that only benefits members of the institution. For simplicity, and to have a stark contrast between 
individual and collective interest, it is in an individual’s rational self-interest to contribute nothing to the 
public good when he or she faces no sanctions for free-riding, but group welfare is maximized if 
everybody contributes the whole endowment to the public good. One of the available institutions is 
characterized by the absence of any explicit opportunity for sanctioning individual free-riders (“no 
punishment”). The second institution provides an opportunity for each group member to sanction any 
other group member after having observed each of their contributions to the public good. We denote this 
institution as “uncoordinated peer punishment” because it does not offer any explicit possibility for group 
members’ to express their normative views on the appropriate contribution level, and these views 
therefore could not coordinate subjects’ contribution behavior. This institution has dominated the 
experimental economics literature on punishment for almost two decades (e.g., Chaudhuri, 2011; 
Hermann et al., 2008; Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, & Villeval, 2003). In our third institution, subjects 
could announce their normative requests so that these requests could, at least in principle, guide and 
coordinate their contribution behavior. This institution is therefore denoted as “coordinated peer 
punishment”. The fourth and final institution (“coordinated central punishment”) maintains the normative 
request but allows for the delegation of punishment to a single (central) authority while also socializing 
the cost of punishment. This type of institution exists in both small-scale societies (e.g. village elders and 
tribal chiefs, with collective punishment by the group) and large-scale societies (e.g., judges, police, 
courts, and prisons funded by taxes). In the experiment, the selection of the central authority is based on 
group members’ views about who should be in that position. For simplicity these views are turned into 
the group’s social choice via majority vote. While elections may not occur explicitly in small scale 
societies, the superior authority of single individuals in these societies is often based on a group consensus 
(Henrich, Chudek, & Boyd, 2015), and the simplest way to implement a consensus in our experiment is 
through voting.  
As mentioned above, both coordinated peer punishment and centralized punishment function very 
well and establish extremely high cooperation levels from the beginning with little need for sanctions. 
After a short adjustment phase, subjects thus predominantly choose these two institutions, while the other 
two institutions - no punishment and uncoordinated peer punishment - become depopulated. In fact, 
uncoordinated peer punishment was basically never chosen from the very beginning. This means that the 
previous literature on the welfare effects of peer punishment – including the early paper by Fehr and 
Gächter (2000) – may have led to a misleading view by focusing on an institution that subjects not only 
universally reject in our setting, but that arguably also lacks an important externally valid feature of many 
environments.6  
The centralized punishment institution completely removes the inefficiencies of uncoordinated peer 
punishment and already leads to payoff levels that are substantially greater than in “no punishment” in 
the first period. Furthermore, centralized punishment removes antisocial punishment. The high efficiency 
of this institution is based on the two key facts. First, many prosocial individuals (i.e., those with prosocial 
                                                     
6 Because uncoordinated peer punishment is basically inexistent, we use the term peer punishment for the coordinated 
peer punishment institution in the following, when it is clear what is meant.  
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other-regarding preferences) enter this institution at the very beginning, leading to high normative 
contribution requests and the election of a prosocial central authority who refrains from antisocial 
punishment and who is capable of enforcing high cooperation levels with relatively low levels of 
punishment. Rather than being merely cheap talk, the high normative requests are associated with high 
actual contributions, suggesting that individuals seem to be guided by the average contribution request. 
Subjects thus quickly establish a strong cooperative culture in the centralized punishment institution. The 
second reason for the high efficiency of centralized punishment is due to its intrinsically beneficial 
properties - even in the absence of endogenous sorting of subjects, this institution converges towards 
high cooperation with comparably little punishment; without endogenous sorting, however, it takes 
considerably more time to establish a culture of universal cooperation. 
Coordinated peer punishment shares many of the good properties of centralized punishment. Many 
prosocial individuals immediately enter this institution; they establish very high normative requests 
followed by equally high contributions. However, this institution requires more actual sanctions during 
a short initial phase, and some antisocial punishment still persists. Nevertheless, payoffs are already 
larger than in “no punishment” in period 1, but the difference is only marginally significant (p = 0.066). 
This is in stark contrast to the uncoordinated punishment institution in, e.g., (Fehr & Gächter, 2000) and 
(Gächter et al., 2008) 
Taken together, our results show that efficient punishment institutions emerge endogenously 
through a competitive process in an environment in which people can “vote with their feet.” Prosocial 
individuals play a key role in this process because they quickly establish a cooperative culture that 
considerably shortens the length of time that it takes to render an institution efficient. While 
uncoordinated peer punishment incurs large initial costs, the combination of endogenous sorting of 
prosocial individuals with the possibility of coordinating group behavior through normative requests very 
quickly makes both peer punishment and centralized punishment the superior institutions. 
Our study is related to several lines of research. First, it is connected to the experimental literature 
on the role of sanctions in the provision of public goods and the enforcement of social norms. Influential 
and insightful previous work has examined the sanctioning rules that subjects in predetermined groups 
select through democratic voting or other collective choice mechanisms (e. g., Yamagishi, 1986; Kosfeld, 
Okada, & Riedl, 2009; Ertan, Page & Putterman 2009; Sutter, Haigner, & Kocher, 2010; Putterman, 
Tyran & Kamei 2011; Andreoni & Gee, 2012; Markussen, Putterman & Tyran 2014). A key feature of 
this literature is that once the sanctioning rule is determined through a collective choice procedure (e.g. 
voting), the sanctions themselves and/or the constraints on feasible sanctions are automatically executed, 
which presupposes a reliable institutional structure that captures important components of modern 
democratic states.7 This contrasts with our peer punishment institution where subjects unconstrained by 
formal rules always execute sanctions. They have, in particular, the complete freedom to determine their 
individual distribution of sanctions and to engage in antisocial punishment – an important potential 
impediment to the efficiency sanctioning systems in uncoordinated peer punishment. In our experiment, 
                                                     
7 For example, in Kosfeld, Okada, and Riedl (2009), subjects can form a (sub)coalition where every member of the 
coalition is automatically punished if cooperation is less than complete. In Ertan, Page, and Putterman (2009),  
subjects can rule out antisocial punishment at a voting stage and an exogenous mechanism then fully enforces that 
rule. In Sutter, Haigner, and Kocher (2010), subjects can vote whether they prefer an institutional environment with 
mutual reward or mutual sanctioning opportunities, and this collective choice is then automatically enforced. In 
Andreoni and Gee (2012), subjects can pay to hire a mechanism that automatically punishes the largest free-rider – 
a proposal that resembles the mechanism proposed by Yamagishi (1986). Finally, in Markussen, Putterman, and 
Tyran (2014), subjects vote on whether to introduce a regime with informal peer sanctioning opportunities. 
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the punisher may voluntarily limit sanctioning due to his own normative views or the group members’ 
informal normative requests, but explicit formal rules that are automatically enforced do not constrain 
him in any way. We therefore believe that one key insight from our paper is that despite the complete 
absence of formal constraints on individual sanctions, peer punishment turns out to be very effective in 
establishing a welfare-improving culture of cooperation quickly.  
Second, our work is related to the literature that has examined the role of competition – through 
individual migration opportunities – between institutions and groups that organize the provision of public 
goods in different ways. Gürerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach (2006 and 2014) pioneered this literature 
and showed that uncoordinated peer punishment slowly becomes more popular and more efficient than 
an institution that rules out any punishment of free-riders. However, during this slow process of acquiring 
a competitive advantage over the no-punishment institution, uncoordinated peer punishment produces 
the well-known collateral efficiency costs typically associated with this institution. In Gürerk, Irlenbusch 
and Rockenbach (2014), for example, uncoordinated peer punishment acquires a stable positive welfare 
advantage over “no punishment” only after period 10, and it takes almost 20 periods to achieve reliable 
efficiency levels of roughly 80% and more. This contrasts with the quick success of coordinated peer 
punishment in our experiment, which already achieves a higher group welfare than “no-punishment” in 
period 1, and generates efficiency levels of close to 80% and more from period 4 onwards. This may be 
one reason why the subjects in our experiment universally reject uncoordinated peer punishment in favor 
of coordinated sanctioning institutions from the very beginning.  
Like Gürerk, Irlenbusch and Rockenbach (2014), Nicklisch, Grechenig, and Thoeni (2016) only 
include uncoordinated peer punishment in the set of competing institutions; like us, they also allow for a 
central sanctioning authority. However, while they exogenously and permanently assign one subject to 
be the central authority, institution members elect our central authority each period, and the authority 
also bears part of the cost of punishment. In addition, individuals' normative requests may have guided 
our central authority – a feature that is absent in their design. These institutional differences give rise to 
important differences in the functioning of centralized punishment: In their experiment, a considerable 
share of the central authorities engage in the antisocial punishment of subjects with above average 
contributions, making centralized punishment even substantially less popular than uncoordinated peer 
punishment.8 This contrasts sharply with our results, where subjects selected very prosocial individuals 
as central authorities. These individuals avoid antisocial punishment altogether and quickly achieve very 
high cooperation and efficiency levels through prosocial punishment patterns. This result suggests that 
the efficiency of centralized punishment depends not only on centralization per se, but also on how the 
central authorities are selected and who gets selected.  
Third, we believe that our results also inform the literature on the evolution of human cooperation. 
The rapid success of our two punishment institution appears to rely on the introduction of two key 
features present in pre-state societies – the possibility to form a normative consensus and the opportunity 
to migrate across groups, which is associated with a predominantly prosocial migration to the punishment 
institutions with a norm consensus opportunity. These results therefore lend support to evolutionary 
models that allow for biased migration (Boyd & Richerson, 2009), for consensus building (Boyd, Gintis, 
& Bowles, 2010) and that emphasize the evolution of a norm-psychology (Chudek & Henrich, 2011). 
                                                     
8 This holds true for the treatment where subjects have perfect information about other group members’ cooperation 
levels – a condition that also prevailed in our experiments. However, the random assignment of central authorities in 
their imperfect information treatments also led to a large share of central authorities who punished subjects with 
cooperative signals.  
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More generally, the fact that prosocial individuals appear to prefer particular institutions suggests that 
nonrandom interactions and assortative matching may have been important forces in the evolution of 
human cooperation (Eshel & Cavalli-Sforza, 1982).  
Fourth, by highlighting that (i) migration may depend on social preferences and (ii) the importance 
of cultural aspects – such as the evolution of informal social norms – our paper may also be useful for 
the economic literature that examines the impact of culture on economic outcomes (e.g., Bowles, 1998; 
Giuliano & Nunn, 2016; Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2006; Lowes, Nunn, Robinson, & Weigel, 2017; 
Nunn, 2014; Tabellini, 2008).  
Finally, our findings may also be interesting for those who study the emergence and the effectiveness 
of centralized punishment institutions from a theoretical perspective (e.g., Acemoglu & Wolitzky, 2016), 
for the literature on the foundations of the enforcement of laws and norms (e.g., Dixit, 2007; Greif, 1989, 
1993), and the literature that discusses the relative efficiency of formal versus informal enforcement of 
norms and contracts (e.g., Fafchamps, 1996; Johnson, McMillan, & Woodruff, 2002; Kranton, 1996; 
McMillan & Woodruff, 1999). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents our experimental design in 
detail. Section 2 presents our results. Section 3 concludes the paper and discusses open questions and 
possible avenues for future research.  
 
1 Experimental design and procedures 
The experiment consists of three parts. Parts 1 and 2 are conducted in the lab during the same session. Part 
3 is conducted online after subjects leave the lab and provides an independent measure of subjects’ social 
preferences. Subjects are initially assigned to a large group of size N ∈ {9,11,12} that stays fixed for Parts 
1 and 2 of the experiment. We attempted to have 12 members in all groups, but occasionally used smaller 
groups due to subjects registering for the study but failing to show up at the lab. Subjects are randomly 
assigned a unique identification number from the set {1,2,. . . ,N} which also stays fixed for Parts 1 and 2 
of the experiment. 
Part 1 consists of five periods of a typical public goods game without punishment. Part 2 consists of 
20 periods of a public goods game in which subjects can endogenously form subgroups by sorting 
themselves into 4 different institutions. Part 1 serves the purpose of familiarizing subjects with the public 
goods game and avoid that they are overwhelmed by the considerable complexity of Part 2 before they 
have learned the basic rules of a public goods game. In addition, individuals’ cooperation rates in Part 1 
provide a measure of their cooperativeness and prosociality in the absence of pecuniary incentives for 
cooperation, which proves useful in interpreting our results. Part 3 is conducted online and measures social 
preferences using the Social Value Orientation scale of (Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011). The 
experiment timeline is summarized in Figure 1. 
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1.1 Part 1: Public goods game 
Subjects begin by playing five rounds of a typical public goods game without punishment. At the beginning 
of each period, subjects receive an endowment of points, e = 20, and can contribute any amount  
gh ∈ {0, 1, … , 20} to a group project. Each point contributed to the group project is multiplied by m and 
shared equally among all N group members. Each point not contributed to the project goes into a private 
account and can be kept by the subject. Thus, per-period earnings of subject h are given by 
𝜋𝜋ℎ = 𝑒𝑒 −  𝑔𝑔ℎ + (𝑚𝑚 𝑁𝑁 )�𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑁𝑁
𝑘𝑘=1
 
As mentioned above, we have N = 12 in most cases, but occasionally we had N= 9 or N = 11. The group 
benefit from a contribution, m, is set to m = 1.5. The parameter values for Part 1 are summarized in Table 
1. They imply that the marginal benefit from a contribution to the group project for the contributor, m/N, 
ranged from 0.125 when N = 12 to 0.167 when N = 9. These marginal benefits provide a considerable 
incentive for free-riding but they are partly counterbalanced by the relatively large group size; previous 
evidence indicates that an increase in group size N that leaves the marginal benefit m/N unchanged (i.e., is 
accompanied by an increase in m) tends to increase cooperation (Isaac, Walker, & Williams, 1994). In each 
period and after making private contribution decisions, group members are informed of every group 
member’s contribution. In addition, they are informed about their earnings from the private account and 
from the group project. 
 
Parameter Value Meaning 
e 20 Endowment 
m 1.5 Multiplier for contribution to public good 
N 9, 11, or 12 Group size 
Table 1: Parameter values used in Part 1. 
 
 
1.2 Part 2: Public goods game with endogenous punishment institutions 
Subjects remain in the same group and retain the same identification number in Part 2 of the experiment. 
Part 2 lasts for 20 periods and provides subjects with the opportunity to form institutions with other group 
members. At the beginning of each period, subjects individually select into one of four institutions and 
interact only with other group members who select the same institution in that period. Migration between 
institutions is costless, and subjects can select any of the institutions at the start of each period. The 
institutions, which we describe in more detail in Section 1.2.1 below, are (i) No Punishment, (ii) 
Uncoordinated Peer Punishment, (iii) Coordinated Peer Punishment, and (iv) Coordinated Central 
Punishment. By “Coordinated,” we mean that each group member could make a normative request 
regarding how much each group member should contribute. In principle, this provides an opportunity to 
coordinate on a social contribution norm that might guide subjects’ contributions. Note, however, that it 
was not possible to state normative requests regarding punishment behavior, and the group members were 
completely free to neglect both their own and others' normative requests.  
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Each period contains a contribution stage which is identical to the situation in Part 1, except that 
contributions to the group project only affect group members who select the same institution. In addition, 
a punishment stage is added which provides an additional endowment in each period. In the event that only 
one subject selects a particular institution in the period, both the contribution stage and punishment stage 
endowments go directly to the private account, and the subject is not able to contribute to a group account. 
This design feature was included because the idea of a public good necessarily involves more than one 
person benefitting from contributions. 
We next describe the four institutions in greater detail. During each period, subjects make several 
decisions, and their choice opportunities depend partly on the selected institution. We then describe the 
information provided to subjects at each decision point. Finally, we describe the material payoffs resulting 
from subjects’ choices. 
 
1.2.1 Institutions 
Subjects begin each period by selecting which institution they want to choose in the current period. For 
the remainder of the period, subjects only interact with other group members who have also chosen the 




No Punishment.  No Punishment is identical to Part 1, except that (i) contributions to the group project 
only affect members of the group who adopt the No Punishment institution and (ii) subjects receive a 
second endowment in the punishment stage which is added directly to their earnings. 
Uncoordinated Peer Punishment.  In Uncoordinated Peer Punishment, subjects make the same 
contribution decision as in No Punishment. However, during the punishment stage, subjects can assign 
deduction points to other institution members which reduce the recipient’s earnings at a cost to the person 
assigning punishment. The cost structure for punishment is described in Section 1.2.3 and defined in 
equation (4) below. 
Coordinated Peer Punishment. The contribution and punishment stages in Coordinated Peer Punishment 
are identical to Uncoordinated Peer Punishment. However, prior to the contribution stage, each institution 
member makes a normative request by privately answering the question, “How many points do you think 
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each participant should contribute to the project?” The average of these requests is reported on each 
institution member’s computer screen during the contribution stage. The normative request is, however, 
non-binding and it is public knowledge that each institution member is informed about the average 
normative request. The cost structure for punishment is described in Section 1.2.3 and defined in equation 
(4) below. 
Coordinated Central Punishment. In Coordinated Central Punishment, one member of the institution is 
elected to assign all of the punishment for the group, and all institution members share the total cost of 
punishment equally. At the start of the period, subjects in Coordinated Central Punishment select a single 
institution member – the central authority – by majority vote who has the exclusive right to assign the 
punishment; the central authority is the person who receives the most votes, and ties are broken randomly. 
After casting their votes, subjects determine their normative requests in the same manner as in Coordinated 
Peer Punishment. Then, subjects enter the contribution stage, where they are informed of the normative 
request and make the same contribution decision as in all other institutions. Finally, during the punishment 
stage, only the central authority can assign deduction points to institution members, and these deduction 
points reduce the recipient’s earnings at a cost which is shared equally by all members of the institution. 
The cost structure for punishment is described in Section 1.2.3 and defined in equation (5) below. 
 
The role of normative requests. The rationale for the introduction of a normative request is that social 
norms are in reality likely to be pervasive in public goods contexts, but the typical public goods experiments 
without communication do not enable people to express their normative views on group members’ 
contribution decisions (Ostrom, 2000). However, letting group members speak to each other face-to-face 
before taking actions in the experiment introduces other potential confounds such as sympathy or antipathy 
among the subjects, idiosyncratic differences in communication styles, reputational concerns that go 
beyond the experiment because subjects are no longer anonymous to each other, etc. Some researchers have 
therefore introduced the possibility of communicating purely numerical information regarding contribution 
intentions or contribution promises among the group members (Bochet, Page, & Putterman, 2006; Bochet 
& Putterman, 2009; Wilson & Sell, 1997).  
These studies show that purely numerical communication is generally unable to establish cooperation 
and occasionally performs worse than an environment without communication. These findings suggest that 
giving merely the opportunity to express a normative request may just enable cheap talk without behavioral 
consequences. A recent study (Fehr & Schurtenberger, 2017) strongly supports this conclusion. The study 
compares a voluntary contribution treatment (i.e., one with no punishment) that allows for individual 
normative requests with an otherwise identical treatment condition without such requests. The results show 
that the normative request is completely ineffective in influencing behavior in this environment9.  
If the normative request is merely cheap talk, why did we then nevertheless introduce it in our setting? 
The reason is that the normative request may help subjects coordinate more easily on a particular 
                                                     
9 The fact that the normative request does not affect behavior in the absence of punishment options is also the reason 
why we did not include an institution with “No Punishment but a normative request”. Because our experiment is 
already relatively complicated, the inclusion of such an institution would have made Part 2 of our experiment more 
complex without providing much insight. To keep the design as simple as possible, we also did not include a Central 
Punishment Institution without normative requests. In addition, in naturally occurring environments where a central 
authority has the power to punish, this power is typically deeply embedded in the normative structure of a society. 
We kept the possibility of Uncoordinated Peer Punishment because this institution has played a major role in research 
over the last 15 years. The inclusion of this institution and its relative performance also allows us to assess whether 
the absence of normative requests in peer punishment constitutes a serious omission.   
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contribution norm when peer punishment and central punishment are possible. There is, of course, no 
guarantee that this norm involves high cooperation, but it is possible. In addition, a high average normative 
request may delegitimize low contributions which, in turn, may enhance the credibility of the punishment 
threat. Our design also enables us to measure whether subjects prefer, ceteris paribus, a normative request 
because we allow for peer punishment institutions with and without normative requests. And finally, the 
existence of the normative request allows us to measure whether subjects indeed live up on average to the 
group’s request.   
 
1.2.2 Information 
The information provided during each period is summarized in Figure 3. At the beginning of each period 
and before subjects join an institution, all subjects are informed of the number of group members who 
joined each institution in the previous period and the average earnings for each institution in the previous 
period. After subjects join an institution, they learn each current institution member's contribution in the 
previous period. Following this, the Coordinated Central Punishment institution elects the central 
authority10, and the Coordinated Peer Punishment and Coordinated Central Punishment institution members 
determine their normative requests; the average of these requests per institution is then transmitted back to 
the institution members. Finally, at the punishment stage, members of all institutions observe the 
contribution of each institution member in the current period. 
 
 
Figure 3: Sequence of information in Part 2.  
 
With the exception of the information feedback on the average normative request, which is a distinguishing 
feature of Coordinated Peer Punishment and Central Punishment, all subjects receive the information 
described in Figure 3 – even if no decision has yet been made at that point. For example, all subjects in a 
matching group are informed about each current institution member's contribution in the previous period. 
We intentionally chose this feature to rule out the desire for increased information as a confounding 
explanation for institution selection. All institutions share the characteristic that subjects receive more 
information about their own institution than they do about the others. This captures the notion that we know 
more about the people we interact with, but only have limited information about those with whom we do 
                                                     
10 In the first period of Part 2 (period 6 overall), subjects are informed of the average contributions of each current 






































not interact.  
 
1.2.3. Material payoffs 
Earnings in each period are the sum of the contribution stage earnings and the punishment stage earnings. 
Contributions stage earnings for individual h in institution i, 𝜋𝜋ℎ𝑖𝑖1 , are given by  
 
  𝜋𝜋ℎ𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑒𝑒1 −  𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑖 + �𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖�∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘=1 , (2) 
where 𝑒𝑒1 is the contribution stage endowment, 𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑖 is the individual’s contribution to the institution project, 
m is the total pecuniary gain per contribution to the institution’s project for all institution members together, 
and 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 is the endogenously determined institution size (number of institutions members). Punishment stage 
earnings for individual h in institution i, 𝜋𝜋ℎ𝑖𝑖2 , are given by 
 𝜋𝜋ℎ𝑖𝑖2 =  𝑒𝑒2 −  𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖(𝑑𝑑) − 𝑟𝑟∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑘𝑘ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘=1 , (3) 
where 𝑒𝑒2 is the punishment stage endowment, 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖(𝑑𝑑) is the cost of punishing other institution members 
for individual h, r is the reduction in earnings for each deduction point received from other institution 
members, and 𝑑𝑑𝑘𝑘ℎ𝑖𝑖 is the number of deduction points that institution member k assigns to individual h in 
institution i. Therefore, the total payoff reduction individual h receives because others punish him is given 
by 𝑟𝑟∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑘𝑘ℎ𝑖𝑖
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘=1 . The cost h bears from assigning deduction points, denoted by 𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖, to other members k 
in his institution i is given by 
 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖(𝑑𝑑) =  ∑ 𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘=1 , (4) 
if h is a member of one of the two peer punishment institutions, and  
 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖(𝑑𝑑) =  ∑ 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴=1𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖  (5) 
if h is a member of the Central Punishment Institution where the cost of all punishments assigned by the 
central authority A are given by ∑ 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘=1 . These costs are shared equally by all 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 institution members. 
Thus, the total cost of assigning a deduction point is 1, but the cost for each institution member is 
determined according to equation (4) in institutions utilizing peer punishment and equation (5) in the 
central punishment institution. In the No Punishment institution 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖, 𝑑𝑑𝑘𝑘ℎ𝑖𝑖 and 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 are always equal to 
zero for all h and k.  
Finally, we imposed a bankruptcy condition so that earnings in a single period could not be negative, but 
subjects still had to pay for assigning deduction points to others even if the tokens could not reduce the 
recipient’s earnings any further.11 Therefore, per-period earnings are given by   
 𝜋𝜋ℎ𝑖𝑖 = max  �𝜋𝜋ℎ𝑖𝑖1 + 𝜋𝜋ℎ𝑖𝑖2  ,0 �. (6) 
                                                     
11 This happened in less than 1% of all cases and was thus rarely a binding constraint.  
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Table 2 summarizes the parameter values used in the experiment. We set 𝑒𝑒1 = 𝑒𝑒2 = 20, m = 1.5, and r 
= 3.  
 
  
Parameter Value Meaning 
𝑒𝑒1 20 Endowment for contribution stage 
m 1.5 total pecuniary gain per contribution to the public good 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 Endogenous Institution size 
𝑒𝑒2 20 Endowment for punishment stage 
r 3 Reduction in earnings from receiving one unit of punishment 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖(𝑑𝑑) See equations (4) and (5) Cost of assigned punishment to others 
Table 2: Parameter values used in Part 2. 
 
1.2.4 Control treatment – Exogenously assigned perfect matching groups 
Under endogenous institution selection, institutions may be successful in establishing and maintaining 
cooperation for two primary reasons. First, cooperative individuals may select into the same institutions, 
and these institutions therefore perform better. Second, the institution may create incentives that induce 
cooperative behavior, regardless of whether the individuals joining the institution are generally cooperative. 
It is, of course, also possible that these two effects are mutually reinforcing. Without a control treatment, 
our design with endogenous selection does not allow us to disentangle the “self-selection effect” from the 
“pure institutions effect”. We therefore conducted a control treatment with exogenous assignment to the 
different institutions. For each matching group in our endogenous selection sessions, we create a matching 
group of the same size and with identical migration patterns. This means that for each session in the 
endogenous selection treatment, and each individual in that session with a given migration path, there is 
matched session in the exogenous assignment treatment with matched individuals that face exactly the same 
migration paths. This also means that for each period and each session of the endogenous selection 
treatment there is matched session in the exogenous assignment treatment in which the distribution of 
subjects across institutions is completely identical. The exogenous assignment treatment allows us to 
examine the effects of institutions independently of self-selection. In addition, by comparing outcomes 
under endogenous selection and exogenous assignment, we can identify the impact of endogenous 
selection.  
 
1.3 Part 3: Social Value Orientation 
Part 3 of the experiment consists of the Social Value Orientation (SVO) measure, which consists of six 
allocation decisions between oneself and one other anonymous individual (Murphy et al., 2011). The 
allocation decisions constitute modified versions of the dictator game  in which the relative price of giving 
varies (Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994).  The SVO measure provides 
a numeric score which can be used to measure each individual’s prosociality. Higher SVO scores indicate 
greater prosociality. Full details of the SVO measure are provided in Online Appendix A.2. This part of the 
experiment was conducted online either two weeks before or two weeks after subjects completed Parts 1 
and 2 in the lab. Subjects knew that one of their allocation decisions would be selected and implemented, 
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and that they would be the recipient of a different anonymous person’s allocation decision; payments were 
mailed to subjects. 
 
1.4 Experimental procedures 
Sessions for Part 1 and Part 2 were conducted in a computer lab at the University of Zurich in December 
2012 and April 2013. Part 3 was conducted online using Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com). Experimental 
instructions are provided in the Online Appendix. Subjects were mostly students from the University of 
Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH-Zurich). Recruitment was conducted using 
ORSEE, and we did not invite students who listed economics or psychology as their major (Greiner, 2015). 
Experiments were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Points were used as the experimental 
currency and converted to Swiss Francs CHF at the end of the study; subjects were informed of the 
exchange rate in the instructions. In Parts 1 and 2, conducted during the same lab session, the exchange rate 
is 1 point = CHF 0.05. In Part 3, conducted online, the exchange rate is 1 point = CHF 0.10. Average 
earnings were CHF 62.29 for the lab session (consisting of both Parts 1 and 2), including a show-up fee of 
CHF 10. Earnings from Part 3 were CHF 15-20. Lab sessions lasted 2.5-3 hours on average, and the online 
portion of the experiment took 10-20 minutes. 
Overall, 256 subjects participated in the lab sessions; 128 subjects participated in the endogenous 
selection treatment, and another 128 subjects participated in the exogenous assignment treatment. Each 
treatment consisted of eleven groups in total. Nine of these groups had twelve members. One group of nine 
members and one group of eleven members were used in each treatment because some invited subjects did 
not come to the lab. Partner matching was used in Parts 1 and 2, so each group remained fixed for the entire 
lab session. 
For subjects in the endogenous treatments (where we predict assortment effects), 84 of 128 subjects 
(66%) completed Part 3 of the experiment online.12 We do not find obvious evidence for selection bias 
among respondents, i.e., subjects who completed Part 3 (average age = 22.0, percent female = 0.37, average 
earnings in Parts 1 and 2 = CHF 63.40) are similar in observable characteristics to those who did not 




2.1  Institution selection and institution performance 
A key question of our study relates to individuals’ preferences for the different available institutions. We 
are, in particular, interested in (i) how frequently Coordinated Peer and Central Punishment are chosen 
relative to Uncoordinated Peer Punishment and (ii) how quickly the punishment institutions dominate in 
terms of their popularity among subjects. We summarize our findings with regard to these questions in  
  
                                                     
12 In the exogenous assignment treatment 96 of 128 subjects (75%) completed Part 3. 
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Result 1 (Institution Selection): 
(a)  In period 1, subjects are initially evenly distributed between the No Punishment (NP), Coordinated 
Peer Punishment (PP), and Coordinated Centralized Punishment (CP) institutions, while 
Uncoordinated Peer Punishment is basically ignored from the beginning.  
(b)  After only a few periods, however, the punishment institutions with norm coordination attract more 
than 80% of the subjects and thereafter the share of subjects attracted by NP becomes negligible.  
 
Evidence for Result 1 is provided by Figure 4 and Table A1 in the Appendix, which are based on the pooled 
data from all matching groups and displays how the distribution of subjects between the different 
institutions evolves over time. These data show that, from the very beginning, the share of subjects selecting 
Uncoordinated Peer Punishment is negligible. In contrast, 37% of the subjects sort into NP, 36% into PP, 
while the remaining subjects prefer CP in period 1. By period 2, however, roughly 75% of the subjects 
already prefer the punishment institutions with normative requests, PP and CP. Following this, more than 
80% always enter these institutions, while the percentage of subjects entering NP becomes negligible. It is 
interesting to compare these results with those in Gürerk et al. (2014), where normative requests were ruled 
out; there it took 15 periods until 80% of the subjects entered the peer punishment institution.  
Once almost all subjects had selected themselves into the two punishment institutions with normative 
requests, CP attracted on average roughly 55% of the subjects while the other 45% selected into PP. These 
average numbers hide however predominant selection into one of the two institutions  at the level of the 
individual matching group (Figure A2 in the Appendix A2). In fact, in four of the eleven matching groups 
literally all subjects selected into the CP institution and in one matching group the large majority preferred 
CP; in six matching groups the overwhelming majority of the subjects (i.e., two thirds or more) selected 
into the PP institution. In addition, after the short initial phase where subjects migrated out of NP, migration 
rates quickly became rather low – typically none or only one subject per matching group changed the 
institution in later periods.  
 
Figure 4:  Distribution of subjects across institutions in Part 2. 
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Result 1a is a powerful indication that in the presence of punishment institutions with an opportunity for 
normative requests subjects strongly reject a punishment institution that does not provide this opportunity. 
This suggests that previous research on peer punishment that rules out normative requests could have 
missed an important aspect of informal peer punishment because choices regarding contributions to public 
goods often seem to be deeply embedded in an existing normative consensus. However, achieving such a 
consensus in the absence of explicit normative requests may be difficult or may at least take a lot of time, 
during which normative mis-coordination occurs. Because Uncoordinated Peer Punishment is basically 
absent from the beginning, we reserve the term peer punishment for Coordinated Peer Punishment for the 
rest of the paper (unless we indicate otherwise).  
The strong dominance of coordinated peer sanctioning and centralized sanctioning raises the question 
of why these two institutions prevail. A plausible hypothesis is that they prevail because they are successful 
in quickly establishing high cooperation and efficiency levels. We find evidence for both conjectures: 
Result 2 (Cooperation and the Efficiency of Punishment Institutions): 
(a) Under both Coordinated Peer Punishment and Central Punishment, very high cooperation levels 
close to 100% of the endowment are quickly obtained.  
(b) In terms of efficiency gains, central punishment already outperforms the no-punishment institution 
from period one onwards, and coordinated peer punishment achieves the same result within a few 
periods.  
 
Figure 5a and 5b illustrate Result 2. Figure 5a shows the average contributions over time in the NP, the PP 
and the CP. The unit of observation is the matching group, so that the average contribution for an institution 
is first taken at the matching group level, and these results are then averaged across matching groups.13 
Figure 5a shows that the average contribution (as a percentage of the endowment) in PP and CP is already 
about 90% in the first period of Part 2, and soon reaches close to 100%. In contrast, average contributions 
in NP quickly decline to low levels.14  
We are not aware of any other research indicating such a rapid achievement of maximum cooperation 
levels. For example, in Fehr and Gächter (2000), subjects’ cooperation level in period 1 is only about 60% 
of the endowment, and, it takes 20 periods until cooperation levels reach 90% of the endowment in Gächter 
et al. (2008).  Likewise, stable cooperation levels of 90% or more are only reached after 10 periods in 
Gürerk et al. (2014).15  
High cooperation levels do not necessarily imply, however, that efficiency gains have been optimally 
                                                     
13 When we show average cooperation and average efficiency across institutions we always proceed in this way. In 
addition, our non-parametric statistical tests always use the average outcome of an institution in the matching groups 
as the unit of observation, and when we run regressions, standard errors are clustered at the matching group level.  
14 We do not show cooperation and efficiency levels in NP after period 6 because the membership of this institution 
during these periods, if there is any, consists typically of N = 1 but cooperation and gains from cooperation require 
at least N=2.  
15 When comparing these experiments one has to keep in mind the potentially different MPCR’s across studies 
because a higher MPCR typically leads to higher cooperation. However, the quick achievement of very high 
cooperation levels in our study relative to Gächter et al. (2008) and Fehr and Gächter (2000) cannot be attributed to 
a higher MPCR. In our study we typically had quickly 5 members in PP and in CP. This yields an MPRC of m/N = 
1.5/5 = 0.3 which is smaller compared to the MPCR of 0.5 and 0.4 in Gächter, Renner and Sefton (2008) in Fehr and 
Gächter (2000), respectively.  
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exploited.16 If high cooperation is only achieved through high punishment, efficiency gains may even be 
negative because punishment is costly for the punished and the punisher. In Fehr & Gächter (2000), for 
example, the efficiency levels were negative during the first few periods, i.e., subjects were worse off during 
these periods compared to a situation with zero cooperation and zero punishment, and the average efficiency 
under peer punishment was not higher during the whole 10 periods of the experiment than in the absence 
of a punishment opportunity (Mann-Whitney U, p = 0.45). The situation was even worse in Gächter et al. 
(2008) because efficiency gains in their 10-period experiment were lower in the presence of a punishment 
opportunity in each period, and the overall efficiency of this institution was therefore lower compared to 
the no punishment treatment (Mann-Whitney U, p =0.033). In fact, the efficiency gains of peer punishment 
were even negative most of the time and, this institution therefore resulted on average in negative efficiency 
gains of -5.1%.  
 
Figure 5a.  Average contributions over time  
 
Figure 5b.  Average efficiency over time 
Figure 5b reveals that the efficiency properties of our two punishment institutions with normative requests 
are radically different because Central Punishment already attains roughly 80% of the available efficiency 
gains in the first period, and Peer Punishment always shows, i.e., from period 1 onwards, higher efficiency 
than NP. Statistically, efficiency is significantly higher in CP relative to NP (Mann-Whitney U, p=0.001) 
in the first period, and the efficiency difference between PP and NP is marginally significant (Mann-
Whitney U, p=0.066). However, the efficiency of PP, as those in CP, is always substantially and 
significantly higher than in NP from period 4 onwards (Mann-Whitney U tests, all p < 0.05). 
Why do coordinated peer punishment and centralized punishment perform so well in terms of quickly 
                                                     
16 We define efficiency as follows. In the absence of any cooperation and punishment zero percent of the potential 
cooperation gains are reaped, i.e., efficiency is zero. If there is full cooperation and no punishment 100% of all 
potential cooperation gains are acquired, i.e., efficiency is 100%. Negative efficiency gains accrue if the gains 
achieved through cooperation are outweighed by the cost of punishment.  
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establishing and maintaining cooperation and in terms of efficiency? One reason could be that the 
institutions themselves have beneficial intrinsic properties that lead to high performance – at least in the 
long run – even with exogenous assignment of individuals to institutions. A second reason could be that 
prosocial individuals are the first to migrate into these institutions and quickly establish a beneficial social 
norm of full cooperation so that those who join later can be smoothly integrated into a “culture of 
cooperation.”  
 
2.2  Endogenous sorting and the culture of cooperation  
To study the intrinsic beneficial properties of our punishment institutions, we conducted experiments where 
we ruled out endogenous selection into institutions, and assigned subjects randomly to the migration paths 
the individuals in the endogenous selection institution chose. The comparison of outcomes in the presence 
and absence of endogenous selection enables us to state  
Result 3 (Role of Endogenous Sorting): 
(a)  Under endogenous sorting into sanctioning institutions, the average cooperation and efficiency 
levels under Coordinated Peer Punishment and under Central Punishment are higher than under 
exogenous assignment during the initial periods, but are indistinguishable after period 12.  
(b)  Under exogenous assignment, the two punishment institutions initially do not outperform NP with 
regard to efficiency, and peer punishment is even significantly worse. 
 
Evidence for Result 3a is provided in Figures 6a – 6d. Figures 6a and 6c show that cooperation levels are 
already higher under endogenous selection at the beginning and throughout the first 12 periods. This pattern 
is also supported by Mann-Whitney U tests. The null hypothesis of equal contributions can already be 
rejected for Coordinated Peer Punishment (p = 0.021) and for Central Punishment (p = 0.012) for the very 
first period.  
A similar picture emerges with regard to efficiency; in both Coordinated Peer Punishment and in 
Centralized Punishment. Endogenous selection is already significantly better in period 1 (MW-tests; PP: p 
= 0.016; CP: p = 0.035)  
The lower cooperation and efficiency levels in the exogenous assignment treatment also mean that the 
two punishment institutions initially do not outperform the No Punishment treatment in terms of efficiency 
under exogenous assignment: PP is in this regard equally as good as NP during the first three periods (MW-
test; p=0.14), and also during periods 4-6 (MW-test; p=0.13). CP is also equally as good as NP during the 
first three periods (MW-test; p = 0.18) but already significantly better in periods 4-6 (MW-test; p = 0.049).  
Result 3 means that the two punishment institutions have intrinsically beneficial properties because 
efficiency and cooperation are eventually very high, even under exogenous assignment.17 However, the 
opportunity to select into institutions endogenously has important cooperation- and efficiency-enhancing 
influences for many periods, and it apparently helps quickly establish high cooperation and efficiency 
levels. These results raise the question what exactly makes endogenous selection such a powerful device. 
Our next result provides the answer to this question.   
                                                     
17 This finding is in stark contrast with the results of (Gürerk et al., 2014), where cooperation under exogenous 
assignment never moves beyond 60% of the endowment under peer punishment while in our setting – where 





Figure 6a.  Contributions over time in  





Figure 6b.  Efficiency over time in  
Coordinated Peer Punishment 
 
 
Figure 6c.  Contributions over time in  
Centralized Punishment 
 
Figure 6d.  Efficiency over time in  
Centralized Punishment 
Result 4 (Culture of Cooperation):  
(a)  Under endogenous sorting, prosocial individuals are quick to migrate into Coordinated Peer 
Punishment and Central Punishment institutions and establish a culture of high cooperation.  
(b)  The culture of cooperation is characterized by a strong consensus from the very beginning that 
subjects should make high contributions and widespread obedience with this social norm.  
(c)  Both punishment institutions successfully integrate migrants into their cooperative culture by 
immediately inducing them to make high contributions to the public good.  
(d)  In the centralized punishment institution with endogenous sorting, this culture of cooperation also 
includes the selection of very prosocial individuals as authorities, whereas the chosen authorities 
are much less prosocial under exogenous assignment.  
 
20  
Figure 7 provides evidence for Result 4a. The figure uses two different measures of prosociality. In 
Figure 7a, we use subjects’ average cooperation level during the baseline public goods game in Part 1 of 
the experiment. This measure makes sense because complete free-riding was in subjects' self-interest in 
Part 1 where no sanctions for free-riding were possible. The average cooperation level in Part 1 is therefore 
a good proxy for a subject’s prosociality. As a robustness check for our findings, we also use subjects’ 
Social Value Orientations (SVOs), that we solicited in Part 3, as a measure of prosociality.  
Figure 7a shows that higher average contributors in Part 1 are more likely to adopt coordinated peer 
punishment and centralized punishment institutions in the first period of endogenous selection. These 
differences are also statistically significant (MW-tests based on individuals’ average contributions in Part 
1 as the unit of analysis; PP > NP, p=0.012; CP > NP, p=0.015). Figure 7b and the associated test shows a 




(a) average baseline contribution 
 
(b) Social Value Orientation 
Figure 7: Assortment in first period of Part 1 when subjects could endogenously select into institutions. 
Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
Result 4b states that subjects in the endogenous selection treatment quickly reached a consensus that 
everybody should make very high contributions. Support for this result is given in Figure 8 below. 
Individuals in the coordinated peer punishment and centralized punishment institutions make higher 
normative requests than members of the same institution under exogenous assignment in the early periods. 
                                                     
18 Since not all subjects completed Part 3 of the experiment on-line, we have fewer SVO observations. We therefore 
pool the PP and CP institutions for the statistical test. See also Section 1.4 for lack of evidence for bias in completing 
Part 3. For those who completed Part 3, 30 subjects selected NP in the first period of Part 2, 33 selected PP, and 19 
selected CP – a distribution that is very similar to the overall distribution in period 1 (see Figure 4). In addition, the 
baseline contributions of those who select into the PP and the CP in period 1, and their SVO scores, are very similar 
(Figure 7a and 7b), so that it appears justified to pool the SVO scores across the two punishment institutions for the 
statistical test. 
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Figure 8 displays the cumulative density functions for groups’ average normative requests19 in both 
institutions under endogenous selection and exogenous assignment for (a) the first period and (b) the first 
five periods. In all cases, the normative request under endogenous selection first-order stochastically 




(a) Period 1. 
 
  
(b) Periods 1-5. 
Figure 8:  Cumulative density functions of groups’ average normative requests in (a) the first period and 
(b) the first five periods. In all cases, the normative request under endogenous selection first-order 
stochastically dominates the normative request under exogenous assignment. Density functions are based 
on individual normative requests in each period. 
 
In the first five periods of the endogenous selection treatment, more than 80% of the subjects in PP had a 
                                                     
19 The cumulative distributions functions of individuals’ normative requests are shown in appendix A3.  
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normative request of 18 or more, while only about 30% of the subjects had similarly high requests under 
exogenous assignment. Likewise, almost 90% of subjects in the CP institution requested a contribution 
level of 17 or more when they self-selected into this institution, while only 60% had similarly high requests 
under exogenous assignment. These results show that the vast majority of subjects requested very high 
contribution levels right from the beginning under endogenous selection, indicating a strong social 
consensus about what is normatively expected from everybody in the group, but a substantial number of 
subjects were satisfied with lower requests under exogenous assignment. 
Requesting a high contribution is one thing, but obeying these requests may well be another. We 
therefore next examine whether the average normative requests were actually obeyed as claimed in Result 
4b. For this, we restrict attention to the first five periods of Part 2 because contributions tend towards full 
contributions quickly and eliminate any variation in the data afterwards. To provide support for Result 4b, 
we regress subjects’ contributions levels on a constant and on the average normative request in a group. In 
addition, we use a restricted model in which we set the coefficient on the constant equal to zero (i.e. β0 = 
0). The restricted model appears justified because we observe relatively few low normative requests and 
cooperation levels so that the estimate of the constant is based on only few observations in the relevant 
range. In fact, we cannot reject the restricted model based on a likelihood ratio test in 3 of the 4 conditions. 
The restricted model can only be rejected in favor of the unrestricted in Central Punishment under 
endogenous selection. Our regression results are reported in Table 3.  
  
Endogenous Selection  Exogenous Assignment 
 Peer  Central  Peer  Central  
 Punishment  Punishment  Punishment  Punishment  
 
 Panel A – Restricted model (constant constrained to zero) 
 
























 (0.083)* (0.581) (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Likelihood ratio, χ2(1) 0.54 6.69 2.49 1.69 
 (0.461) (0.010)*** (0.115) (0.194) 
N 201 292 201 292 
Number of clusters 11 11 11 11 
Bootstrap samples 9,999 9,999 9,999 9,999 
Table 3: The role of normative requests as a coordination device for contributions in the first five periods of 
Part 2. OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered by matching group. Bootstrapped p-values are 




The remarkable fact in Table 3 is that in the restricted model the coefficients on the normative request are 
always very close to one. They range from 0.968 to 1.001, indicating that groups’ average normative 
requests are clear coordination devices leading to contributions that are not significantly different from the 
request. Even if we allow the constant to deviate from zero, the slope on the normative request is again 
close to one – except for the condition under Central Punishment with endogenous selection. However, 
even in this condition, the predicted contributions for commonly observed values of the normative request 
(i.e., for requests from 16-20) almost perfectly match the normative request.20 Thus, overall a high 
obedience with the average normative request prevailed in both punishment institutions and under both 
treatment conditions, but the normative requests were significantly higher, and less dispersed, under 
endogenous selection.  
Because the prosocial subjects tend to be among the first to enter the punishment institutions, the 
question arises how these institutions manage to integrate the more selfish individuals into their cooperative 
culture. Previous studies have shown that the migration of selfish individuals into cooperative groups may 
undermine cooperation (Ehrhart & Keser, 1999). However, Result 4c states that both punishment 
institutions successfully integrated migrants into their cooperative culture and immediately induced them 
to make high contributions. Figure 9 below shows that this was indeed the case. The figure displays 
subjects’ contribution types after entering a punishment institution as a function of contribution type in the 
period immediately before entering the institution.  
The figure shows that under endogenous selection 95% of the migrants into the punishment 
institution were low or moderate contributors before they entered; 87% of the migrants under exogenous 
assignment were previously low and moderate contributors. However, approximately 70% of the subjects 
who were previously low contributors under endogenous selection (far left in Figure 9) immediately 
become high contributors upon entering a punishment institution. The figure also shows that the 
corresponding number is much lower (roughly 40%) under exogenous assignment. Taken together, these 
findings show that the big majority of previous low contributors is quickly integrated under endogenous 
selection into the cooperative culture prevailing in our punishment institutions. 
 
                                                     
20 For example, with a normative request of 16, the predicted contribution is 16.669 (= 5.693 + 16*0.686). With a 
normative request of 20, the predicted contribution is 19.413 (= 5.693 + 20*0.686). 
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Figure 9: Contribution behavior immediately before and after entering a punishment institution. Horizontal axis 
indicates the contribution type in the No Punishment institution in the last period before joining a punishment 
institution. Bar height indicates relative frequency of contribution type upon entering a punishment institution 
conditional on type before migrating. Number above bars indicates the overall number of subjects from that 
treatment who fall into the category. The number in parentheses indicates the relative share of these subjects in the 
treatment population.  
The quick establishment of a cooperative culture under endogenous sorting is further confirmed by the 
selection of prosocial authorities (Results 4d) in Central Punishment. This result is displayed in Figure 10, 
which shows the prosociality characteristics of the authorities selected in the first period of Part 2. In the 
overwhelming majority of cases (87%), the authority to punish was delegated to the highest baseline (Part 
1) contributor when endogenous selection was possible, while this occurs only 50% of the time under 




(a) Contribution rank of the authority  (b) Contribution type of the authority 
 
Figure 10: Baseline contribution behavior in Part 1 for subjects elected as central authority in first period of Part 2. 
 
Furthermore, Figure 10b illustrates that the selected authorities' baseline cooperation levels are very 
different between treatments. Under endogenous selection, 50% of the initial authorities contributed on 
average at least 16 points to the group project during Part 1, and 87.5% contributed at least 11 points. In 
contrast, 75% of the initial authorities in the exogenous assignment treatment contributed on average half 
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of their endowment (10 points) or less. Subjects under endogenous selection thus not only select the highest 
contributor most of the time (Figure 10a), but the chosen authorities' baseline cooperation level is much 
higher compared to that of the elected authorities under exogenous assignment (Figure 10b). This means 
that endogenous selection ensured from the first period onwards that prosocial subjects were selected for 
the authority position in Central Punishment.  
Taken together, these results suggest that subjects selecting punishment institutions under endogenous 
selection quickly established a cooperative culture. These institutions attracted a high share of prosocial 
individuals who quickly established high normative requests; these requests successfully coordinated the 
whole group to high contribution levels so that little punishment may have been necessary to enforce the 
high and widely agreed upon contribution norm. The immediate selection of very prosocial authorities 
further supports the cooperative culture in Central Punishment. In contrast, exogenous assignment of 
subjects to institutions puts sand into the gears of cooperation. It prevents the self-selection of prosocial 
individuals, leads to a lower prosociality of the selected authorities, and causes substantial adjustment costs 
during the initial phases because subjects demand lower contributions and cooperate less, which then 
requires higher punishment costs to establish cooperation. 
 
2.3  Punishment in a culture of cooperation  
What role did actual punishment of free-riders play in the quick establishment and the compliance with a 
culture of cooperation? To what extent do the two punishment institutions differ with regard to the 
sanctioning of free-riders? Are these institutions capable of removing or diminishing the problem of 
antisocial punishment, i.e., the sanctioning of those who contribute more than the group average to the 
public good? And how does endogenous selection affect the punishment behavior? Our next result provides 
answers to these questions.  
Result 5 (Prosocial and antisocial Punishment):  
(a)  Regardless of the sorting mechanism, the sanctioning probability for free-riders, i.e. those who 
contribute below the group’s average, is generally very high. However, it is higher under Peer 
Punishment compared to Central Punishment, and those who are sanctioned generally receive 
considerably harsher punishments in Peer Punishment.  
(b)  Regardless of the sorting mechanism, we observe a non-negligible frequency of antisocial 
punishment under peer punishment while, under Central Punishment, anti-social punishment is 
almost completely eliminated.  
(c)  Free-riders generally face a lower probability of being punished in the exogenous assignment 
treatment.  
Empirical support for Result 5a is provided by Figure 11, Figure 12, and Table 4. Figure 11 shows that free-
riders who deviate more than 2 units from the group average are punished in 100% of the cases under Peer 
Punishment, while the punishment probability is somewhat lower under Central Punishment, but in most 
cases still substantially above 50%. Table 4 shows that across all levels of free-riding, the probability of 
punishment is 96% (69%) in Peer Punishment under endogenous selection (exogenous assignment) and 
65% (41%) in Central Punishment under endogenous selection (exogenous assignment). The difference 
across punishment institutions is largely driven by the fact that there are more small deviations (between 0 
and 2 units below the group average) under Central Punishment that are punished with a considerably 
smaller probability than under Peer Punishment. The strength of punishment for the punished is shown in 
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Figure 12, which indicates that Peer Punishment generally imposes considerably stronger sanctions on free-
riders. This result is further corroborated by econometric analyses in appendix A4.  
 
Table 4: Probability of punishment for below-average and above average 
contributors based on data from all 20 periods. 
Table 4 and figures 11 and 12 also provide insights into the prevalence and the strength of antisocial 
punishment across institutions as described in Result 5b. In line with the literature, we define antisocial 
punishment as the sanctioning of those who contribute above the group average. Tables 4 shows that 8-9% 
of the positive deviations from the group average were sanctioned in Peer Punishment, and Figure 11 
indicates that the probability of antisocial punishment even increases for stronger positive deviations from 
the group average.21 This pattern contrasts sharply with the observations in Central Punishment, where 
Figure 11 illustrates that antisocial punishment is basically absent. Only 2-3% of the positive deviations 
were sanctioned in Central Punishment (Table 4 and Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11: Probability of punishment for given deviations from the group’s average contribution. The 
number above each bar indicates the absolute number of observations for that bar. The number of 
punishment cases for each bar are given by the probability of punishment times the number of 
observations for that bar.  
                                                     
21 The regression analyses in Appendix A3 show that this leads to a significant increase in the average 
payoff reduction for higher positive deviations from the group average.  
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Figure 12: Average payoff reduction received by the punished for given deviations from the group’s 
average contribution. The number above each bar indicates the absolute number of punishment cases 
for that bar. 
  
Finally, Table 4 and Figure 11 also provides support for Result 5c by showing that the probability of 
punishment is generally lower in the exogenous assignment treatment. This lower probability is largely 
driven by a much higher prevalence of small deviations (between 0 and 2 units below the group’s average 
contribution) in the exogenous assignment treatment. Under Peer Punishment, for example, the number of 
small deviations is more than five times higher in the exogenous treatment (110 versus 21 cases). Likewise, 
under Central Punishment the number of small deviations is 245 under exogenous assignment but only 92 
under endogenous selection. Both in PP and CP these small deviations are punished with much higher 
frequency under endogenous selection (Figure 11).  
Taken together, these sanctioning patterns suggest that the high probability of punishing free-riders 
under endogenous selection helped in quickly establishing and sustaining a culture of cooperation in this 
treatment, whereas the subjects under exogenous assignment not only established lower contribution norms 
but minor free-riders also faced a lower probability of punishment, which led to a relatively large frequency 
of small negative deviations from the group average. Finally, Peer Punishment led to a harsher punishment 
of free-riders compared to Central Punishment, but at the same time, there is also a higher probability of 
anti-social punishment when peers can sanction. In fact, antisocial punishment was basically non-existent 





3 Discussion and concluding remarks 
The threat of peer sanctioning looms large in most human societies. The currency in which they are 
expressed are manifold and range from a raised eyebrow to ridicule, from verbal outrage to corporal 
punishment, from harassment to ostracism. A large empirical literature indicates that peer sanctioning 
often generates large collateral damage in the form of excessive or ill-guided punishment. The 
conclusions of this literature are typically based on what we have called “uncoordinated peer 
punishment”, but in practice the threat of peer punishment often appears to be based on a wide normative 
consensus about what constitutes appropriate behavior. For this reason, we introduced the opportunity for 
normative consensus building into our experiment – an opportunity that has no behavioral effects in the 
absence of targeted sanctioning opportunities. In addition, we combine this with the possibility to migrate 
across communities with different sanctioning institutions. We allow, in particular, uncoordinated peer 
punishment to compete with coordinated peer punishment and with centralized punishment by an elected 
authority – both institutions that allow for normative consensus building. It turns out that subjects 
universally reject uncoordinated peer punishment in favor of the two other punishment institutions. This 
strong revealed preference for normative consensus building suggests that previous research – including 
that by one of the co-authors of this paper – failed to take a potentially important characteristic of efficient 
peer punishment into account.  
In fact, coordinated peer punishment and centralized punishment by an elected judge in 
combination with the migration opportunities leads to the quick emergence of an efficient and universal 
culture of cooperation. Prosocial individuals migrate first into these punishment institutions and they 
immediately use the consensus building opportunity to establish a social norm of high cooperation that is 
credibly enforced by peers or the judge so that relatively little actual punishment is necessary to enforce 
the norm. Therefore, these two sanctioning institutions become quickly more efficient than the no 
punishment institution.  
In our view, these results are not only interesting for the literature on public goods and sanctioning 
systems, but they also may inform the literature on the evolution of human cooperation by suggesting to 
take biased migration and normative consensus building as potentially important mechanisms into 
account (Boyd et al., 2010; Boyd & Richerson, 2009). Likewise, by providing insights into the 
mechanisms of social norm formation, the literature on the role of culture and social norms in economic 
life (e.g., Bowles, 1998; Giuliano & Nunn, 2013; Guiso et al., 2006; Lowes et al., 2017; Nunn, 2014; 
Tabellini, 2008) may benefit.  
Our results raise, of course, also many new questions that could be pursued by future research. 
Recent papers (Buffat & Senn, 2017; Muthukrishna, Francois, Pourahmadi, & Henrich, 2017) have 
pointed out that those who punish under centralized punishment may be subject to the temptations of 
corruption, which then induces dysfunctional sanctioning patterns. Institutional competition via voting 
with the feet mechanisms, normative consensus building, and the election of judges may also prove to be 
important in combatting the corruption of leaders and judges in centralized sanctioning systems. Another 
literature has pointed out the potential relevance of counter-punishment opportunities (Denant-Boemont, 
Masclet, & Noussair, 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008) within a given period, i.e., the possibility of the sanctioned 
individuals to immediately strike back in the period in which the sanction occurred. Previous work on 
counter-punishment neither allowed for normative consensus building nor for migration across groups, 
but both of these institutional mechanisms possibly constrain the relevance of counter-punishment. The 
rationale for this conjecture is two-fold. First, the informally binding nature of the social norm could also 
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put constraints on counter-punishment by the free-riders. Second, due to prosocial migration and the norm 
consensus opportunity, there is little punishment to begin with that could trigger counter-punishment.22 
Finally, it is worthwhile to point out that counter-punishment across periods was not ruled out in our set-
up because group members knew subjects' ID numbers. It was, for example, possible to counter-punish a 
judge in the next period because the judge’s ID number was known. But this never occurred.   
Finally, it would be interesting to examine how consensus building and migration affect the relative 
performance of different sanctioning systems when information about others' behavior is imperfect and 
costly to acquire. Which normative standards of evidence emerge endogenously in such an environment, 
and how do various sanctioning systems differ in this regard? Studying this environment in the context 
of our set-up raises a whole set of exciting new questions.  
 
  
                                                     
22 In Fehr and Schurtenberger (2017), normative consensus building is possible in a counter-punishment set-up. They 
show that the norm consensus opportunity significantly improves cooperation and efficiency under peer punishment 
despite the opportunity for direct counter-punishment. In addition, they show that counter-punishment is itself 
affected by normative concerns: the presence of a norm consensus opportunity encourages the victims of antisocial 


















           1 0.37 0.02 0.36 0.26  
2 0.24 0.04 0.38 0.34  
3 0.14 0.03 0.34 0.48  
4 0.11 0.04 0.24 0.61  
5 0.07 0.01 0.30 0.63  
6 0.08 0.02 0.41 0.50  
7 0.07 0.02 0.38 0.54  
8 0.06 0.02 0.39 0.52  
9 0.03 0.01 0.42 0.54  
10 0.03 0.01 0.41 0.55  
11 0.02 0.00 0.44 0.54  
12 0.03 0.00 0.43 0.54  
13 0.01 0.00 0.42 0.57  
14 0.01 0.00 0.41 0.58  
15 0.01 0.00 0.41 0.59  
16 0.01 0.01 0.45 0.54  
17 0.02 0.00 0.46 0.52  
18 0.02 0.00 0.47 0.52  
19 0.03 0.00 0.43 0.54  










Figure A2. The figure shows how subjects selected themselves into the different institutions 
within the matching groups. Numbers above each graph indicate the matching group ID. 
Subjects predominantly preferred the centralized punishment institution in 5 out of eleven 
matching groups; in four of them even all subjects migrated to CP. In six of the eleven matching 
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Econometric Analysis of Punishment Patterns  
 
In the table below, we use Tobit regressions to study the impact of subjects’ negative and positive deviations 
from the group’s average contribution on the received punishment. We also used negative and positive 
deviations from a group’s average normative request as regressors, but this model performed substantially 
worse than the model with deviations from the average contribution. We report differences in the Akaike 
Information Criterion, ∆AIC, in Table 5; these values ranged from 26.04 to 79.38 in our data, and ∆AIC > 
10 is generally considered very strong evidence in support of the favored model (Burnham & Anderson, 
2002). 
The table shows that the coefficient for negative deviations from the average contribution is always 
positive – regardless of treatment and punishment institution. Thus larger negative deviations are more 
strongly punished. It also shows that negative deviations from the average are more harshly punished under 
peer compared to central punishment – again this holds regardless of the treatment. Finally, we observe that 
larger positive deviations are more harshly punished in peer punishment – indicating antisocial punishment 
– while these deviations are less harshly punished under central punishment.  
 
 










Own negative deviation 0.234 0.080  0.367 0.195 
from average contribution (0.000)*** (0.001)***  (0.000)*** (0.001)**
 Own positive deviation 0.212 -0.097  0.146 -0.410 
from average contribution (0.000)*** (0.022)**  (0.029)** (0.003)**
* N 1,008 1,323  1,008 1,323 
Left-censored 886 1,194  825 1,167 
Uncensored 122 129  183 156 
Number of clusters 11 11  11 11 
Log-likelihood -582.82 -589.61  -778.60 -821.82 
AIC 1171.64 1185.22  1563.20 1649.64 
∆AIC 79.38 26.04  96.24 41.22 
Bootstrap samples 9,999 9,999  9,999 9,999 
 
TableA3: Punishment received based on deviation from average group contribution during the period. Tobit 
regressions with robust standard errors clustered by matching group. Coefficients reported are average partial effects. 
Bootstrapped p-values given in parentheses based on 9,999 bootstrap samples computed using pairs cluster bootstrap-
t with clustered standard errors.23 ∆AIC is the difference in Akaike Information Criterion for the reported regression 
                                                     
23 An econometric issue arises when running regressions on our data, but there is a simple solution. We cluster standard 
errors at the level of the matching group, but we have a relatively small number of matching groups. It is well known 
that the standard errors will be inconsistent in these cases and lead to over-rejection of the null (Bertrand, Duflo, & 
Mullainathan, 2004). Bootstrapping can overcome this problem; we use a pairs cluster bootstrap-t with cluster robust 
standard errors as proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) that performs quite well in their simulations. In this bootstrap, 
resampling is at the level of clusters instead of individual observations. The Wald statistics from the bootstrap samples 
are then used to create the distribution against which the Wald statistic from the original data is tested. Cameron, 
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compared to a model with deviations from normative request as independent variables; values exceeding 10 are 
considered very strong evidence in support of the regressions presented in the table. 




                                                     
Gelbach, and Miller (2008) suggests using a wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure in OLS regressions; however, in their 
simulations, the pairs cluster bootstrap-t with cluster robust standard errors performs only slightly worse than the wild 
cluster bootstrap-t. We opt to use the pairs cluster bootstrap-t with cluster robust standard errors for consistency with 
later analyses in which the wild cluster bootstrap-t is inappropriate. The wild bootstrap involves estimating 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖 and 
either adding or subtracting the residual εi with equal probability to create new pseudo-samples, where 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖∗ is the value 
of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  in the wild bootstrap pseudo-sample. With corner solutions in a Tobit regression, we would need to set 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖∗ = 0 
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